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 Abstract. Renewed marginalization, coupled with ethnic nationalism, could 
severely hamper peace, stability, governance, and the delivery of essential 
service to the people. Therefore, disharmony resulting from marginalization 
and regional discontent is no more dismissible issues. Muslim 
communities in Africa, South Asia, and some parts of the Middle East are 
considered to be highly underprivileged in terms of representation, 
economic prospects, and education. This exclusion has made young 
Muslims particularly vulnerable to recruitment by terrorist insurgents who 
appear to sympathize with their plight. The terrorists usually offer them 
possible alternatives to earn income and to express their grievances. Since 
the stability of any society largely depends on political, security, and 
economic freedom, communities that do not attain it, are likely to be 
vulnerable to recruitment by insurgent groups that meet their needs. This 
study examined how Somali Muslims' perceptions of marginalization 
influenced their radicalization in Kenya. A total of 400 respondents were 
sampled from a target population of 623,060. Sixty respondents were 
Muslim religious leaders in Garissa county, 40 respondents were law 
enforcement personnel working in Garissa County, 100 respondents were 
government officials in administrative offices within the County, and 200 
respondents were local Somali youths aged between 17–35 years. Data 
was collected from the respondents through the administration of the 
questionnaires in hard copy form. The split-half method was employed to 
guarantee reliability of the survey, while validity was addressed by phrasing 
all survey and FGD questions appropriately in line with the research 
objectives. The collected data was then examined using quantitative and 
qualitative analysis methods. The quantitative analysis focused on 
numerical data, while qualitative analysis was used to analyze non-
numerical information provided by respondents. In analyzing Somali 
Muslim views on marginalization and its effect on radicalization, this study 
employed correlation research design and Samuel Stouffer's relative 
deprivation theory of social behaviour. The findings of this study indicate 
that the perceptions of marginalization by Somali Muslims are related to an 
upsurge in radicalization. 
Keywords: extremism; marginalization; radicalization; social exclusion. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The problem of radicalization of Muslims in 
many developing countries and some parts of 
western nations by global terrorist groups is a 
significant concern. Increasingly, marginalized 
Somali Muslims in Kenya are joining terrorist in-
surgency networks such as the Al-Shabaab and 
the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) [1]. 
However, this trend is not an isolated phenome-
non. Turkmani R. argues that in the United States 
and some parts of Western Europe, disenchanted 
youths are progressively resorting to extremism 
to gain acceptance, identity, and purpose, which 
they do not find in their local communities [25]. 
Perceptions of marginalization appear to influ-
ence youth affiliation to extremist groups largely. 
The marginalization of specific ethnic communi-
ties has been linked to extremism. A study by 
Abrahams J. [2] found that young Muslims’ mar-
ginalization and social inequality increased their 
radicalization and their tendency to join extrem-
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ist groups. The study focused on young people 
aged between 16 and 24 years who were either 
unemployed or underemployed. The report 
found that marginalization increased feelings of 
frustration and apathy. These feelings catalyzed 
the radicalization of Muslim youths. 
Similarly, Woodhams K. [26] examined the role 
of social network analysis in preventing violent 
extremism and radicalization. Woodhams K. 
found that social and political marginalization 
were push factors that increased the likelihood of 
radicalization by young Muslims. The study fur-
ther found that nations that marginalized certain 
groups through economic, social, and political 
exclusion provided an enabling environment for 
radicals to recruit disenfranchised youths suc-
cessfully. The implication is that community-level 
factors, including how perceived targets of social, 
political, and economic exclusion view their cir-
cumstances, play a critical role in influencing 
youth involvement with extremist groups. 
Muslim communities in Africa, South Asia, and 
some parts of the Middle East are considered to 
be the most underprivileged in terms of repre-
sentation, economic prospects, and education 
[26]. This exclusion has made young Muslims 
particularly vulnerable to recruitment by terror-
ist insurgents, who appear to sympathize with 
their plight and offer them possible alternatives 
to earn income and to vent their grievances. 
Since the stability of any society largely depends 
on political, security, and economic freedom [26], 
terrorists might target unstable communities by 
addressing their economic, security and social 
needs. Moreover, the potentially discriminatory 
impact of counter-terrorism laws and policies on 
Muslim societies in Europe and other Western 
countries is a subject that continues to herald 
various debates among experts [7]. European 
Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (EUAFR) 
documented a report which found that intoler-
ance towards the Muslim community was gain-
ing increasing concerns and was manifested in 
various ways, including social marginalization 
and discrimination. The report further found that 
such prejudice was a great hindrance to commu-
nity cohesion and integration across member 
States. 
Many discourses on terrorism portray radicaliza-
tion as an essential theme. Radicalization refers 
to a process in which extremist beliefs and ide-
ologies are developed [21]. Radicalization is of-
ten a psychosocial process that entails steady ad-
vancement from physical setting to ideas and 
eventually to behaviour. Most literature provides 
a conceptual rather than empirical evidence of 
radicalizations into terrorism (see, for example, 
[1, 10, 21]. A more nuanced comprehension of 
the radicalization process is crucial in under-
standing how social exclusion influences the per-
ceptions of marginalized groups. While the exact 
sequence of radicalization is debatable, several 
theories have been advanced to explain this pro-
gression. Studies have sought to examine the 
critical influencers of radicalization among mar-
ginalized communities. 
For example, Fishman S. [10] found that eco-
nomic measures predisposed marginalized 
communities to radicalization. Some of the eco-
nomic measures that he studied include unem-
ployment rates, income inequality, involvement 
in government help programs, social capital, po-
litical exclusion, and social support, such as the 
number of services that are available to commu-
nities. Fishman explained that social capital in-
cluded aspects such as single-parent families and 
divorce rates, while political exclusion included 
participation in local campaigns and elections. 
Fishman’s findings indicate that community-level 
factors significantly influence radicalization. 
Other studies have examined specific factors that 
influence the radicalization of marginalized 
communities. For example, a survey by Angus C. 
[4] examined features of socio-economic griev-
ances such as poverty and unemployment. The 
study found that there was a significant relation-
ship between poverty and radicalization among 
Muslims. Young Muslims living in poverty were 
likely to be radicalized by the offer of employ-
ment and high status. Based on these findings, 
the study concluded that perceived grievances, 
which facilitated the radicalization of members of 
specific marginalized communities, were intensi-
fied by feelings of perceived systematic injustice 
directed at marginalized communities [1]. Özer-
dem A. and Podder S. [21] also found that ex-
tremist groups’ grievances and feelings of exclu-
sion influenced the recruitment of youth combat-
ants.  
The probability that extremist factions will radi-
calize marginalized groups is linked to several 
conditions. The extent to which specific commu-
nities felt that they were excluded or included in 
a broader community influenced their likelihood 
of being radicalized. Woodham K. [26] posits that 
communities deprived of resources and experi-
enced considerable social disruption exhibited 
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higher rates of radicalization. People’s desire to 
belong has also been suggested as another possi-
ble reason for their involvement in radicalization. 
Marginalized communities may seek viable al-
ternatives to meet their desire for inclusion and 
acceptance, and in many cases, terrorist groups 
present themselves as the necessary substitute. 
Several theories have been suggested to explain 
the process of radicalization. According to the 
Relative deprivation theory terrorists are gener-
ally not poor or drawn from a more impover-
ished socio-economic background. Berman E. [6] 
argues that deprivation is relative, not merely 
regarding pertinent others, but also comparative 
to individuals’ self-expectations and earlier ful-
fillments. Therefore, Berman E. claims that peo-
ple who have improved living standards tend to 
overemphasize the pace with which they want 
their lives to advance. Consequently, a gap occurs 
between individuals’ expectations and reality. 
The resultant frustration escalates the probabil-
ity of social turbulence and radical tempera-
ments. 
Suggestions have been made that fundamental-
ism and antagonism are predominant among 
outwardly well-integrated and exceedingly ac-
complished Muslim minority members [16]. 
Seemingly, those minority members belonging to 
developed socio-economic backgrounds have ex-
traordinary expectations regarding socio-
economic prosperity and integration. At the same 
time, they also seem more likely to be challenged 
with institutional marginalization (real or per-
ceived), which prevents integration and social 
mobility. Those seen to be integrated might dis-
cover that their anticipations are frustrated, 
which may lead to experiences of rejection as 
well as exclusion from society [15]. A subcate-
gory may show a biological preference for in-
strumental aggression.  
 
METHODOLOGY 
This study used correlational research design to 
gather data from various respondents selected 
among the various residents of Garissa Town. 
Correlation research design was preferred since 
it enables a researcher to determine the effect of 
one variable (independent) on another variable 
(dependent) [5]. Since this study was meant to 
examine how marginalization of Somali Muslim 
communities in Kenya contributes to their radi-
calization, the approach was suitable as it would 
enable an in-depth inquiry about the situation 
from the concerned people. 
This study was confined to Garissa County and 
the unit of analysis was all local residents of 
Garissa County. Garissa County is an administra-
tive area located in the former North Eastern 
Province of Kenya. Ethnic Somalis largely domi-
nate the County. Six constituencies comprise 
Garissa County: Balambala Constituency, Garissa 
Township Lagdera Constituency, Fafi Constitu-
ency, Ijara Constituency, and Dadaab Constitu-
ency [14]. The choice of Garissa County was 
largely informed by the fact that the County has 
been a prime target of terrorist attacks with the 
worst case being attack on Garissa university 
campus in which 148 lives were lost. Alleged in-
volvements of local Somali-Muslims in terror at-
tacks within the area and their recruitment to 
join radicalized groups are some of the primary 
reasons why the researcher selected the area of 
study.  
The target group included all Somali Muslims 
who are residents of Garissa County. The re-
spondents were drawn from employees working 
in Garissa Police Station, employees at Garissa 
County Commissioner’s Office, religious leaders 
at Aladhiya Mosque, and Somali Muslims work-
ing or studying at Garissa University College.  
The study involved a sample of 400 respondents. 
The selection of sample was based on the for-
mula proposed by Yamane T. [27]. The sample 
size was therefore derived as follows (1):  
 
  
 
       
,      (1) 
where n – Sample size required; N – Total study 
population; e – The level of precision. 
 
  
       
               
 = 399.74 = 400 respondents. 
 
Stratified random sampling technique was used 
to select 400 respondents. 200 respondents were 
local Somali youths aged between 17 and 35 
years and working or studying at Garissa Univer-
sity College. 100 respondents were Somali Mus-
lim employees aged 36- 60 years and working in 
Provincial county administration’s office in 
Garissa County, 40 respondents were various law 
enforcement personnel working in Garissa 
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County and 60 respondents were local leaders 
drawn from the area. 
Out of the 400 selected respondents 50 were in-
cluded in focus group discussions (FGD) while 
the other 350 were administered with question-
naires. Out of the 50 respondents selected for in-
clusion in FGDs, 20 were Police officers from 
Garissa county commander’s office, 10 respon-
dents were Muslim religious leaders drawn from 
Riyadha Mosque and 20 respondents were So-
mali Muslim employees drawn from Provincial 
County Administration Office. The sampling dis-
tribution procedure has been illustrated in Ta-
ble 1. 
 
Table 1 – Table of Sample distribution procedure 
Target Group Number of 
Respondents 
Garissa Police Station 40 
Riyadha Mosque 60 
Garissa County 
Administration Office 
100 
Garissa University College 200 
Total 400 
 
Information for this study was collected using 
questionnaires and Focus Group Discussions 
(FGD). The questionnaires were closed ended, or 
open ended. The survey questions were focused 
on the objectives and the aim of the research. 
Questionnaire was selected as the most prefer-
able research instruments in this study because it 
is less costly and has minimal interference from 
the researcher, which reduces the responses bias 
by the respondent [12]. The respondents filled 
the questionnaires as the researcher waited and 
later collected them. All the questionnaires ad-
ministered were, thus, collected back. 
Qualitative information was collected using Fo-
cus Group Discussions. The FGD’s involved key 
informants selected from the target population 
and who were considered to be information- rich 
in regards to the problem under study.  
Once the data to be used in this study had been 
collected it was classified, compared and com-
bined with empirical material from the FGDs and 
field notes to extract the meaning for a better 
understanding of the subject under study. There-
after, the data units were combined according to 
the same topics or themes in order to produce a 
coherent meaning. Results were later presented 
and recommendation drawn in line with the ob-
jectives and findings of the study. 
In order to establish content validity, the re-
searcher had to ensure that items on the ques-
tionnaires related to the two main constructs be-
ing measured (marginalization and radicaliza-
tion). The validity of the research instruments 
was also established by submitting the research 
instruments to experts for evaluation. The ques-
tionnaire was submitted to a team of skilled re-
searchers from Africa Nazarene University. The 
suggestions provided by the experts were used 
to develop and improve the research instruments 
before beginning the process of data collection. 
Furthermore, the instrument was piloted to a 
designated sample of Somali Muslims in Garissa 
County Commanders Station. Piloting was meant 
to improve the content validity of the instrument. 
Reliability is when a particular measure yields 
the same results, under the same circumstances 
even when they are measured at different points 
[13]. The instruments’ reliability was established 
using the spit-half method. Using this method the 
survey questionnaire was administered to two 
groups of respondents and a score was then cal-
culated based on each half of the two scales. 
Great correlations between the two scales indi-
cated that the questionnaire was reliable. 
 
RESULTS 
A total of 400 respondents (60 Muslim religious 
leaders in Garissa County, 40 law enforcement 
personnel, 100 government officials, and 200 lo-
cal Somali from Garissa University College) fully 
completed and returned the questionnaires. 
Therefore the return rate of questionnaires used 
in the study was 100%, which was considered 
adequate to provide the information on margin-
alization and the rise in radicalization in Garissa 
County.  
Results of the age of respondents are presented 
in Figure 1.  
From the study, it was revealed that, majority of 
the respondents, 202 out of 400, were aged be-
tween 31 and 40 years. The respondents aged 18 
to 30 years and those aged 41 to 54 were 114 
and 84 respectively. 
The results of the respondents’ level of education 
are as illustrated in Table 2. 
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Figure 1 – Respondent’s Age 
 
Table 2 – Respondents’ level of education 
Level of Education Frequency Percentage 
University 53 13 
Tertiary college 133 33 
A – level 67 17 
O – level 147 37 
Total 400 100 
 
The study found that most of the employees 
working in Garissa county had basic education, 
with the majority, 144 out of 400 having attained 
‘O’- level of education. This was closely followed 
by 129 out of 400 respondents who had tertiary 
level of education. Those with ‘A’- level of Educa-
tion were 64 out of 400. 49 out of 400 had the 
highest level of qualifications, being a University 
degree. 
To elicit response of Muslims views concerning 
radicalization, the respondents were asked 
whether they believed marginalization of Somali 
Muslim increased their likelihood of joining radi-
calized groups. The results of Somali Muslim 
views on radicalization in Garissa County are as 
shown in Figure 2. 
 
 
Figure 2 – Somali Muslims views on radicalization 
in Garissa County 
According to the results of the study, 276 out of 
400 respondents strongly agreed that marginali-
zation and profiling of Muslims affects their like-
lihood to join radicalized groups. 99 out of 400 
respondents agreed with this position while only 
25 respondents strongly disagreed with this po-
sition. 
When the respondents were asked whether they 
thought the government had marginalized So-
mali Muslims in Garissa County, they gave the 
following responses: 
“No. The introduction of County government has 
gone a long way in countering equality in resource 
allocation” (Participant 13). 
“Yes. Accessing basic needs is still a challenge to 
us” (Participant 137). 
“Yes. The government is still limiting the registra-
tion of Somali Muslims as Kenyan Citizens” (Par-
ticipant 47). 
“Yes. Garissa County is underdeveloped when com-
pared to other counties in terms of road networks, 
education and health facilities” (Participant 82). 
“Yes. The region has lagged behind for decades in 
terms of development” (Participant 58). 
 
When the respondents were asked whether they 
thought some government policies contributed 
to marginalization of Somali Muslims, most of 
them agreed, claiming that the government’s de-
velopment policy was biased. They cited the fact 
that the government had not balanced develop-
ment of institutions of higher learning in Garissa 
County as it had done in other Counties inhabited 
by non Somali populations. The presence of 
Garissa University College, as the only public uni-
versity in Garissa County was particularly cited 
by respondents as indicative of inequality in de-
velopment of educational infrastructure. Others 
cited policies on issuance of travel documents, 
Identity Cards and birth certificates, which they 
claimed took longer and sometimes they could 
not get. The respondents further said that there 
were instances where stop and searches policies 
enforced by police officers on patrol were mostly 
aimed at Somalis. Some of the respondents cited 
marginalization in regard to access to education 
and basic healthcare facilities.  
Some of their responses were as follows: 
“Yes. Investigative policies that focus on Somali 
Muslims as the prime targets of terror-related in-
cidences” (Participant 72). 
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“Yes. Most often it is so difficult for a Somali Mus-
lim youth to acquire a national I.D. Card. This in 
turn, leads to a sense of frustration and a feeling of 
alienation, which causes them to resort to terror-
ism through radicalization” (Participant 115). 
“No. government policies are formulated with the 
national agenda in picture. The policies are not 
necessarily formulated with a certain region as the 
target” (Participant 72). 
 
The respondents were then asked whether they 
thought the government had put any measures in 
place to reduce the rate of radicalization in 
Garissa County. Their responses were: 
“Yes. The government is investing in public educa-
tion” (Participant 63). 
“Yes. Involving the public in policy formulation ini-
tiatives to address radicalization” (Partici-
pant 115). 
“Yes. There are measures such as police under-
cover investigation. However, I feel some of the 
measures are not addressing the root cause of the 
problem. The government should be proactive and 
not reactive in addressing radicalization” (Partici-
pant 14). 
 
When the respondents were asked to discuss 
some of the strategies which they thought the 
government should implement in order to pre-
vent radicalization in Garissa County, they sug-
gested that there was need to fast track the proc-
ess of issuance of National Identity Cards to en-
able Somali Muslims who are Kenyan citizens to 
walk freely within the country, access viable op-
portunities of development and compete equally 
in the job market. Others emphasized on the 
need to establish more infrastructure such as 
educational institutions, healthcare facilities and 
roads to rural areas proportionately to attract 
more investors and enhance regional develop-
ment. 
The analysis of respondents’’ background infor-
mation mainly focused on how their age and 
level of education was related to their responses 
and how these in turn affected the results of the 
study. 
The age of the respondents was considered to be 
an important factor because people of different 
ages are affected differently by the problem of 
marginalization. The young people might be af-
fected through lack of employment while the 
older groups might be affected largely by lack of 
or inadequate healthcare facilities due to their 
deteriorating health. As revealed in figure 4.1, 
some of the emerging issues from examination of 
respondents of different age groups was the fact 
that the young respondents, particularly of ages 
18-30 were concerned that marginalization had 
reduced opportunities of finding institutions of 
higher learning in Garissa.  
One respondent pointed out that: 
“Most private institutions have closed due to the 
threat of terror after Garissa University College 
attack and we do not have another public univer-
sity” (Participant 365). 
 
Youth respondents in the age of 18-30 were fur-
ther concerned about restrictions brought about 
by increased security operations. For instance, 
one respondent stated that: 
“I can no longer go out and enjoy club music with 
my friends at night…” (Participant 271). 
 
Respondents in the ages between 31–40 were 
mostly concerned about lack of job opportunities. 
A young respondent in FGD expressed his frus-
tration stating: 
“Formal employment in Garissa is next to impossi-
ble! I have been applying for the last 2 years and I 
still don’t have a job” (Participant 9). 
 
From the study findings, it was therefore evident 
that the older generations (41–54 years old) 
were largely concerned about developmental 
agenda including the ability of the government to 
meet certain necessities such construction of 
roads to improve accessibility and build health-
care facilities. On the contrary, young respon-
dents were particularly concerned about fewer 
opportunities of education especially in institu-
tions of higher learning. In their view, opportuni-
ties of higher learning were important since most 
employment opportunities that have better re-
munerations and other benefits require a mini-
mum of college education. 
The level of education was an important consid-
eration because people of different levels of edu-
cation have different conceptualization of issues. 
One of the emerging issues with regard to the 
level of education was the fact that most edu-
cated persons tended to give a more critical ex-
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planation to the questions. For example, one re-
spondent observed that: 
“…it is true the government may not meet the per-
tinent needs of a community or region, but I don’t 
think this can in itself explain radicalization be-
cause then we would have radicalized groups in 
Ukambani, Turkana, or some parts of Nyanza, 
which lack basic necessities such as water, electric-
ity and roads…I think these are predisposing con-
ditions” (Participant 26). 
 
Another respondent with a university education 
observed that: 
“While research on underemployment and radi-
calization tend to point to youth who are frus-
trated and who become instruments to be used by 
extremists like ISIS, Al-Qaeda and Al-Shabaab, I 
think these youths have no alternative sources to 
vent their frustration or avenues to use their en-
ergy…” (Participant 5). 
 
On the contrary the less educated gave a superfi-
cial explanation to the problem of radicalization, 
sometimes based on their feelings rather than 
logic. For example, one respondent while ex-
plaining his views concerning radicalization 
stated:  
“I think radicalization is not evil if you only focus 
on enemy in war, who want to kill you” (Partici-
pant 48). 
“This is unfair, only Muslims are marginalized!” 
(Participant 4). 
 
From the study findings respondents with lower 
academic qualifications were less likely to inter-
rogate issues and provide critical examination of 
issues raised. Their understanding of the perti-
nent problem was more superficial and likely in-
hibited by strong emotional feelings. On the con-
trary respondents with higher levels of academic 
achievements argued their position on issues, 
sometimes drawing support from authoritative 
sources. The varied approach engendered by re-
spondents from different educational back-
ground was, thus, important in data analysis and 
deriving conclusions. 
Inferential statistics. Inferential statistics analy-
ses the quantitative findings based on the hy-
potheses of the study. The analysis involves test-
ing the null hypotheses and rejecting or accept-
ing them. 
The first hypothesis of this study was: 
H0(1): There is no statistically significant rela-
tionship between radicalization and Somali Mus-
lims’ access to basic health, education and Em-
ployment opportunities. 
In order to test this hypothesis the researcher 
carried out a chi-square test of independence on 
responses to questionnaire. The researcher 
wanted to test whether there was a statistically 
significant relationship between radicalization in 
Garissa county and equal access to basic health, 
education, and employment opportunities.  
The null hypothesis for the test was that there 
was no relationship between radicalization in 
Garissa County and Somali Muslim access to ba-
sic health, education and employment opportuni-
ties. The results of the test are tabulated in Ta-
ble 3. 
The chi-square test in Table 4 shows that there is 
a statistically significant relationship between 
radicalization in Garissa County and perceived 
inequality in access to basic health, education 
and employment opportunities (X-Square = 9.39, 
DF=1, p < 0.032). 
 
Table 3 – Relationship between radicalization and access to education, health and Employment opportunities 
(cross-tabulation) 
 Do you think Somali Muslims have equal access to basic health, 
education opportunities employment opportunities as other 
Muslims and other religious groups? 
Total 
Yes No 
Do you think radicalization is a 
potential problem in Garissa 
County? 
Yes 99.2 88.8 188.0 
No 
111.8 100.2 212.0 
Total 211.0 189.0 400.0 
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Table 4 – Chi-Square Tests of Relationship between radicalization and access to education, health and 
Employment opportunities 
Chi-Square Tests Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) Exact Sig. (2-sided) Exact Sig. (1-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 9.39a 1 .032   
Continuity Correctionb 7.55 1 .038   
Likelihood Ratio 9.40 1 .032   
Fisher's Exact Test    .036 .019 
Linear-by-Linear Association 9.37 1 .033   
N of Valid Cases 400     
Notes: a) 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 88.83; b) Computed only for a 
2x2 table. 
 
The strength of this relationship is given in the 
Asymmetric measures in Table 5. 
 
Table 5 – Symmetric measure of Relationship 
between radicalization and access to education, 
health and Employment opportunities 
Symmetric Measures Value Approx. Sig. 
Nominal by Nominal 
Phi .248 .032 
Cramer's V .248 .033 
N of Valid Cases 400  
 
Phi value of 0.248 shows a moderate relationship 
indicating a strong association. 
The first null hypothesis which stated that there 
is no statistically significant relationship between 
radicalization and Somali Muslims’ access to ba-
sic health, education and employment opportuni-
ties was therefore rejected and the alternative 
hypothesis accepted implying that inequitable 
access to basic health, education and employ-
ment opportunities by Somali Muslims is related 
to radicalization. 
H0(2): There is no statistically significant rela-
tionship between unemployment or underem-
ployment and radicalization of Somali Muslims. 
The results are shown in Table 6. 
 
Table 6 – Relationship between unemployment / 
underemployment and Radicalization 
 Radicalization  
Unemployment or Underemployment r = 0.708** 
p = .000 
Table 6 shows a significant positive correlation (r 
=.708, p = .000) unemployment or underem-
ployment and radicalization. Therefore the hy-
pothesis that “there is no statistically significant 
relationship between unemployment or under-
employment and radicalization of Somali Mus-
lims”, was rejected. This shows that there is sta-
tistically significant relationship between unem-
ployment or underemployment and radicaliza-
tion of Somali Muslims. The implication is that 
access to employment opportunities may reduce 
the chances of Somali Muslims being radicalized 
while reduction in such opportunities may in-
crease their likelihood of becoming radicalized. 
H0(3): There is no statistically significant rela-
tionship between government policies in Garissa 
county and radicalization of Somali Muslims. 
In order to test this hypothesis the researcher 
carried out a chi-square test of independence on 
responses to questionnaire. The researcher 
tested whether there was a statistically signifi-
cant relationship between radicalization in 
Garissa county and government policies. The null 
hypothesis for the test was that there was no sta-
tistically significant relationship between radi-
calization in Garissa County and government 
policies in Garissa County. The results are tabu-
lated in Table 7. 
The chi-square test in Table 8 shows that there is 
a statistically significant relationship between 
radicalization in Garissa County and perceived 
inequality in access to basic health, education 
and employment opportunities (X-Square = 7.88, 
DF=1, p < 0.05). 
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Table 7 – Relationship between radicalization and government policies (cross-tabulation) 
 Do you think radicalization is a potential 
problem in Garissa County? 
Total 
Yes No 
Do you believe that some government policies contribute 
to marginalization of Somali Muslims? 
Yes 87.4 98.6 186.0 
No 100.6 113.4 214.0 
Total 188.0 212.0 400.0 
 
Table 8 – Chi-square test of Relationship between radicalization and government policies 
Chi-Square Tests Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) Exact Sig. (2-sided) Exact Sig. (1-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 7.88a 1 .0375   
Continuity Correctionb 6.20 1 .0431   
Likelihood Ratio 7.89 1 .0375   
Fisher's Exact Test    .422 .216 
Linear-by-Linear Association 7.86 1 .0375   
N of Valid Cases 400     
Notes: a) 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 87.42; b) Computed only for a 
2x2 table. 
 
The strength of this relationship is given in the 
Asymmetric measures Table 9.  
 
Table 9 – Chi-square test of Relationship between 
radicalization and government policies 
Symmetric Measures Value Approx. Sig. 
Nominal by Nominal 
Phi .344 .038 
Cramer's V .344 .038 
N of Valid Cases 400  
 
Phi value of 0.344 shows a moderate relationship 
indicating a strong association. 
Therefore the hypothesis that “there is no statis-
tically significant relationship between govern-
ment policies and radicalization of Somali Mus-
lims”, was rejected. This shows that there is sta-
tistically significant relationship between gov-
ernment policies and radicalization of Somali 
Muslims. The implication is that access to em-
ployment opportunities may reduce the chances 
of Somali Muslims being radicalized while reduc-
tion in such opportunities may increase their 
likelihood of becoming radicalized. 
 
DISCUSSION 
According to the study findings, most respon-
dents were of the opinion that radicalization 
stemmed from the political, economic, and social 
marginalization of Somali Muslims. These find-
ings are consistent with previous studies, which 
have established that marginalization influences 
people’s social lives. For example, Saucier G., 
Shen-Miller S., and Stankov L. [23] researched the 
effects of social exclusion on social activities. 
They found that experiences of supposed exclu-
sion or discrimination can prompt aggression 
and anger in people. Their study also established 
that individuals confer tremendous importance 
to stable, enduring social affiliations and that 
there is a strong need to belong experienced by 
human beings. The authors concluded that rejec-
tion and social exclusion lead to susceptible ego-
tism, giving rise to mental states of aggression 
and anger. More so, they discovered that social 
exclusion undermines pro-social actions [23], 
and escalates aggressive actions, even when the 
object and source of aggression are different. 
This outcome may look like its counterintuitive; 
nevertheless, it denotes that being left out fosters 
the compulsion for broad retaliation. Dala-
coura K. [9] postulated that the pursuit of ego-
tism is an essential underlying impetus for sui-
cide. 
Kenyan-Somali and Muslims’ exclusivity from 
access to benefits enshrined in Kenya’s constitu-
tion indicates a shocking void of people lacking 
identity [19]. Their historical exclusion has led to 
a perception of being fewer Kenyans within the 
community. The unchanging perception of play-
ing second-fiddle citizens to the other Kenyans 
persists. Though they are native Kenyans, they 
experience alien treatment from fellow Kenyans 
and especially the police. Moreover, this view has 
seen them regarded as extremists who perpe-
trate violent attacks. In an instance, Kenyan-
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Somali nationals and Somalis were attacked by 
citizens of Kenya who turned against them in the 
aftermath of detonation of explosives on Novem-
ber 8, 2012, in Nairobi’s Eastleigh area. However, 
this was not the first instance in which Somalis 
received a rejection. Following a grenade explo-
sion at St. Polycarp church on November 30, 
2012, culminating into the death of a child and 
injuries to nine others, an enraged mob attacked 
Somalis in Eastleigh with stones and sticks, in an 
incident that led to thirteen Somalis sustaining 
injuries and property loss [19]. 
Individuals have interactions with the environ-
ment. Their knowledge of the world influences 
perceptions and responses to the phenomenon 
around them. This awareness of reality, no mat-
ter accurate it is, impacts their behavior. The sub-
jective interpretation by people of what is soci-
ety, as opposed to the objective truth, may bring 
about terrorism and radicalization [11]. How-
ever, conforming to radical explanations of reli-
gious conviction is an indicator rather than a ba-
sis of radicalization. Krueger A. and Laitin D. [16] 
argued that people contrast in the range to which 
they are in want of cognitive cessation, which 
denotes the preference for definitive structure 
and order, and a yearning for stable and well-
founded knowledge. Individuals who need clo-
sure strongly were found to have a lower toler-
ance of ambiguity, appear less willing to experi-
ence, more apt to dogmatism and authoritarian-
ism [16], and more disposed to espouse tradi-
tionalist ideology. With intergroup situations, 
closure positively stemmed from the yearning for 
consensus in in-groups as well as the rejection 
coming from people holding diverged opinions. 
When the desire for closure is strengthened, in-
dividuals focus on the in-group to seek satisfac-
tion and gratification. Accordingly, in-group par-
tiality, together with an out-group derogation, 
intensifies with the wish for instantaneous and 
lasting information. Without a doubt, Miriti G., 
Mugambi M., & Ochieng R. [19] gathered that 
craving for closure had a definite relation to iden-
tifying with the in-group as well as the receipt of 
attitudes and beliefs of in-group members. Re-
cently, Alao A. and Jaye T. [3] submitted that the 
prerequisite for cognitive closure adds to ‘group-
centrism,’ a pattern of behavior that comprises 
in-group preferential, rejection of different, the 
preservation of group standards, pressures to 
attitude homogeneity and the encouragement of 
autocratic leadership. Significantly, beyond being 
just a personal trait, the necessity for closure 
similarly deviates as a role of the circumstances. 
Certain particular circumstances, such as disor-
ders, mental fatigue, or time pressure, can bring 
the incentive for cognitive closure. Nonetheless, 
such beliefs can turn out to be entrenched in a 
person’s mindset and become a powerful influ-
ence after radicalization. 
Xenophobic attacks and treatment of Somali 
people as aliens have further increased their lack 
of sense of belonging. Consequently, this has en-
hanced the opportunities of Somalis joining the 
extremist groups to find a perfect fit. A culture of 
inclusion needs to be there when handling and 
responding to violence to bring change since, in 
most cases, these terror attackers are unidenti-
fied owing to their tactics of concealing them-
selves within the masses when attacking. Thus, 
attacking a group is ineffective as well as unpro-
ductive [8]. A real threat is, in effect, unavoidable, 
that the uninvolved in the victim communities 
could see sense in defending and protecting 
themselves against the “alien,” thus pushing peo-
ple to extremism. 
The ostracizing or wrong treatment of people 
tends to influence them to behave with hostility 
towards others, although they were the source of 
their maltreatment or not. Ostracizing also leads 
to the reduction of pro-social behavior in their 
lives [20]. Ostracizing finds credence alongside 
the hypothesis that individual experiences of dis-
crimination against self or instances of rejection 
often influence a person’s tendency to fall into 
radicalization.  
The process of radicalization is grounded in 
macro-level elements of society, such as foreign 
policy, global developments in the realms of cul-
ture, politics and the economy, and integration. 
The formation and blending of people around a 
social identity predate the radicalization process 
and serves to form the group’s status as per the 
self-categorization theory.  
Radicalization is fuelled by aspects of everyday 
living such as reduced integration, the perceived 
‘War against Islam’ discrimination, and other so-
cietal factors that predispose people to the 
thought that they are threatened as a society 
[18]. It creates the element of an ‘in-group,’ peo-
ple joined by race, religion, feeling threatened by 
an ‘out-group.’ The social dynamics predicate the 
dealings with members of the ‘in-group’ with fa-
vor.’ At the same time, the ‘out-group’ is dealt 
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with in a derogatory manner, which often trans-
lates to violence against them as opined in the 
social identity theory espoused by Rakodi C., Ga-
tabaki-Kamau R., and Devas N. [22] and 
Lazear E. [18]. Individual threat Factors such as 
strained personal relationships, disorders, and 
life’s pressures affect an individual’s ability to 
develop cognitive closure. These factors exacer-
bate the need for immediate and permanent in-
formation to the group, making the individual(s) 
eschew those values which the group espouses 
while rejecting those of the out-group [20]. The 
threats coming from religious leaders, family, 
peers, and the media may motivate victims to 
take action. In some rare cases, the individual has 
already decided that violence is the most appro-
priate means of dealing with the threat. Resort-
ing to violence is not the norm, as the belief sys-
tem might advocate for pacifist solutions to the 
same problem. The belief system that influences 
an individual’s choice is dependent on sources of 
information, affecting individuals in society and 
character traits forming the individual.  
Regardless of these factors, the element of coin-
cidence cannot be ruled out as meetings with 
people, and our interaction with them is gov-
erned more by chance than design. In addition to 
these situations in life might act as triggers as 
they affect the individual, social and public 
spheres leading one to opt for violence. Khalil J. 
and Zeuthen M. posited that acts of terrorism 
could and are often preceded by factors that call 
for vengeance or provoke the out-group against 
the in-group [15]. In the change towards radicali-
zation, behavioral change is evident in individu-
als who have undergone ideological transforma-
tion replacing their belief system with another 
one, which purportedly provides solutions to the 
problems be-devilling them. The entry of one in-
dividual into radicalization attracts and pulls in 
new converts into the group [24]. This mode of 
radicalization is classified under a type that 
draws its strengths from social dynamics.  
The social context provides various reasons by 
which people may be radicalized. These include 
social pressure, group’s norms, social identifica-
tion, and affection to the group. In these groups, 
groups’ processes and interactions and not radi-
cal ideologies lead people to radicalization. These 
processes are rooted in the micro-level in the in-
dividual and social spheres, as opposed to the 
macro-level [24]. Hence radicalization is likely to 
start as a product of social concerns rather than 
the mainstream belief that ideological interests 
cause it. It is when variant causal factors are em-
bedded in an original context that the population 
might become radicalized; that is whether inher-
ent identity concerns might be tied into a fertile 
ground for radical beliefs to fester. Social interac-
tion dynamics play a very central role in explain-
ing how people can step in the late phases of 
radicalization. Hence the likelihood of being radi-
calized depends on interaction with a radicalized 
person. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
The purpose of the study was to examine Somali 
Muslims’ views on marginalization and rise of 
radicalization in Kenya. The research utilized 
correlational research design. The data was col-
lected using questionnaires and Focus Group 
Discussions. The analysis involved descriptive 
and inferential statistics. The data was presented 
in form of tables, figures and charts. The analysis 
of data revealed that most respondents believed 
that marginalization of Somali Muslim increased 
their likelihood of joining radicalized groups. Ac-
cording to the respondents, some of the causes of 
radicalization include: discrimination in em-
ployment, in-group identity, Limited access to 
education and the need to address grievances. 
The respondents further identified terrorism, 
and increased school drop-outs as some of the 
primary effects of upsurge in radicalization.  
This study recommends that the Government 
must addressed perceived grievances and other 
factors that cause social, economic and political 
exclusion. Secondly, the government should en-
gage all communities in capacity building pro-
grams that foster inclusivity and empowerment.  
Dealing with regional disparities in Kenya de-
mands a fresh approach could involve the formu-
lation and implementation of policies and pro-
grammes based on equity, as well as the design 
and actualization of an integrated regional devel-
opment framework. Legal reforms would be nec-
essary to create a more cohesive framework for 
addressing regional inequities while a robust 
monitoring framework will come in handy in the 
monitoring of the achievement of key indicators 
and milestones of balanced regional develop-
ment. Further, recognizing the various players in 
regional development is critical. A possible pitfall 
is the absence of effective coordination mecha-
nisms, which could severely impede efforts to 
promote balanced regional development. 
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